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Abstract 
This study investigates whether mobile phone penetration modulates the effect of different 
indicators of governance on some indicators of the ease of doing business in Sub-Saharan 
Africa with data from the period 2000-2012 by employing the Generalised Method of 
Moments. Three broad concepts of governance are explored: (i) political (comprising voice & 
accountability and political stability/no violence), (ii) economic (involving government 
effectiveness and regulation quality) and (iii) institutional (including corruption-control and 
rule of law). Ten dimensions of entrepreneurship are considered. Two main findings are 
established with respect to the net effects of the interaction between mobile phones and 
governance dynamics. They are (1) reduced cost of business start-up procedure, the time to 
build a warehouse and the time to resolve an insolvency and (2) increased time to enforce a 
contract, to register a property and to prepare and pay taxes.  Implications for theory and 
policy are discussed. Some of the engaged policy implications include the following.  (i) 
Measures on how to leverage on the potential of mobile phone penetration for 
entrepreneurship opportunities by addressing challenge of access to  and affordability of 
mobile phones on the one hand and on the other hand, improving on the role of the mobile 
phone as a participative interface between emerging entrepreneurs and  governance. (ii) The 
relevance of the mobile phone in mitigating information asymmetry between entrepreneurs 
and government institutions, notably by: reducing government inefficiency (which potentially 
represents an additional cost to doing business) and decreasing informational rents, 
bureaucracy and transaction costs. 
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1. Introduction  
This study investigates whether mobile phone penetration1  modulates the effect of 
different indicators of governance on some indicators of the ease of doing business in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA)2. At least three reasons motivate the inquiry. 
 First, there is a high potential for information and communication technology (ICT) 
penetration in Africa given that high-end markets in Asia, Europe and North America are 
experiencing stabilization in the growth of ICTs like mobile phones (see Penard et al., 2012; 
Asongu, 2015). Hence, policy reforms could be leveraged on the mobile phone penetration 
potential to address economic concerns like job creation in the African continent. 
 Second, entrepreneurship for job creation has been documented as one of the principal 
remedies for Africa’s growing population and corresponding unemployment (Tchamyou, 
2016; Daouda et al., 2016). In essence, the current generation is witnessing the most 
significant demographic transformation and Africa is playing a substantial role in the 
transition. To be sure, the continent’s population has been projected to double by 2036; 
representing about twenty percent of the world total (UN, 2009; Asongu, 2013). 
Unemployment, especially among youth, has been documented as one of the most important 
challenges of this demographic transition inter alia: criminal activities and engagement in 
armed conflicts (Brixiova et al., 2015; AERC, 2014). The continent has been endowed with 
the fastest growing youth demography, which represents about 20 percent of its population. 
The percentage of population between the ages of 15 and 24 may represent sub-optimal and 
negative externalities if jobs are not available to accommodate this anticipated demographic 
shift.  
 Third, in the light of the above policy concerns, the literature has not substantially 
addressed linkages between ICT and entrepreneurship in Africa. The study closest to this 
relationship is Tchamyou (2016) which investigated the role of the knowledge economy in 
African business. It concluded that the four dimensions of the World Bank’s knowledge 
economy index played a fundamental role in driving the starting and the continuation of 
business in Africa. The conclusion of Tchamyou is broadly consistent with the extant 
                                                          
1
 Throughout this study, the terms "mobile’, ‘mobile telephony’, ‘mobile phones’ and ‘mobile phone penetration’ 
are used interchangeably.   
2
 Consistent with Naudé (2010) and Brixiova et al. (2015), entrepreneurship is defined in this study as the 
resources and processes  whereby individuals can use market avenues to create new enterprises. The terms 
‘entrepreneurship’ and ‘doing business’ are used interchangeably throughout the study.  
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theoretical and empirical literature (which is engaged in Section 2) on the importance of 
knowledge spillovers in entrepreneurship (Acs et al., 2013; Hayter 2013; Kuada, 2014; Ghio 
et al., 2015; Afutu-Kotey et al., 2017), notably:   the relevance of social media in promoting 
entrepreneurship (McCann & Barlow, 2015; Jones et al., 2015; Wang, 2016); the employment 
of social entrepreneurship to boost technology (Mulloth et al., 2016); knowledge sharing for 
the success of  entrepreneurship (Allen et al., 2016); innovating the mobile phone for 
entrepreneurship (Asongu & Biekpe, 2017) and linkages between ICT, openness and 
entrepreneurship (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018).  
We extend this literature by assessing whether mobile phone penetration modulates 
the effect of different indicators of governance on some indicators of the ease of doing 
business. Whereas governance is the main independent variable, mobile phone penetration is 
considered as a policy variable because in the modelling exercise, it modulates the effect of 
governance on entrepreneurship. The motivation to include governance indicators builds on a 
stream of recent literature on the relevance of good governance in addressing sustainable 
development challenges such as unemployment in Africa. Theoretically, the quality of 
governance has been increasingly linked with improving: (i) the quality of life and the 
efficient allocation of resources (Fosu, 2013; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014), (ii) the situation 
of the deprived elderly (Fonchingong, 2014) and (iii) the foundation  for changes in society 
(Fosu, 2015a, 2015b; Efobi, 2015; Ajide & Raheem, 2016). 
 In addition to the above justification for harnessing good governance and mobile 
phones for entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), there has been caution in scholarly 
circles not to consider the mobile phone as a silver bullet of development (Mpogole et al., 
2008, p. 71). To enhance opportunities for policy implications, three main governance 
categories are employed, namely: (i) political governance (involving political stability/no 
violence and voice and accountability); (ii) economic governance (covering government 
effectiveness and regulation quality) and (iii) institutional governance (comprising corruption-
control and the rule of law). “Political governance is defined as the election and replacement 
of political leaders. Economic governance is the formulation and implementation of rules that 
enable the delivery of public goods and services. Institutional governance is the respect of the 
state and citizens for institutions that govern interactions between them” (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016a, p. 2).  
In the light of the above, the primary contribution of this paper is to complement the 
existing macroeconomic and institutional literature on how entrepreneurship can be boosted in 
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less developed countries. The inquiry combines the issues raised by assessing how the 
potential for mobile phone penetration (discussed in the second paragraph) can modulate the 
effect of governance on entrepreneurship (discussed in the third paragraph) in order to address 
the identified gap in the third strand (covered in the fourth paragraph). Any boost in 
entrepreneurship which could potentially address contemporary policy challenges in the 
continent is discussed in the second strand. Therefore, this investigation seeks to address the 
following research question: does mobile phone penetration modulate the effect of different 
indicators of governance on some indicators of the ease of doing business in SSA? Such 
positioning substantially deviates from the microeconomic literature on employing technology 
in entrepreneurial opportunities. This literature is discussed in the section that follows. The 
remainder of the paper is presented as follows. The theoretical underpinnings and related 
literature are dicussed in Section 2. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results and corresponding discussion while Section 5 
concludes with suggestions on future research directions.  
 
2. Theoretical Underpinnings and Related Literature  
 The relevance of knowledge and ICT in economic prosperity has been the subject of 
much scholarly concern (Asongu et al., 2016).  The literature is consistent with a two-way 
causality flow between economic development and knowledge.  Compared to the neoclassical 
growth theories which acknowledged technology and know-how as public goods and services 
which are strictly exogenous to the economic system, both the neo-Schumpeterian and 
endogenous interpretations of economic development are the basis for new economic 
development (Howells, 2005). According to these underlying new growth underpinnings, 
progress in technology is the result of an immediate investment by citizens via resource 
mobilizations which are critically related to human resources (Romer, 1990).   
 As recently documented by Brixiova et al. (2015), the relevance of productive 
entrepreneurship for economic development as well as variations in the types of 
entrepreneurship across nations have already been substantially studied (also see Baumol, 
1968, 1990). According to the authors, both empirical and theoretical literature on factors 
affecting entrepreneurship in developing countries in general and Africa in particular are 
comparatively scarce. Some papers in this strand include: Baumol (2010); Naudé (2008, 
2010); Leff (1979); Brixiova (2010, 2013) and Gelb et al. (2009).  
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 The policy concern for youth unemployment in Africa has already been discussed in 
the introductory section. Entrepreneurship is a means by which this policy syndrome can be 
addressed. The following principal causes of youth unemployment have been documented in 
the literature, inter alia: changes in population settings (Korenman & Neumark, 2000); 
development of human resources (O’Higgins, 2001); social capital (like networks and family 
background) (Coleman, 1988); mismatches in geography and skills (2003) and idiosyncratic 
specificities and structural variations of economies (Peterson & Vroman, 1992). 
  Alagidede (2008) has established that entrepreneurship in Africa may often be too 
risky. Eifert et al. (2008) investigated the cost of doing business on the continent and 
concluded that existing estimates undervalue the comparative performance of African 
corporations. A legal view of changes in and challenges of doing business in South Africa 
was provided by Taplin and Synman (2004). The intensity by which trade influences business 
cycle synchronization is assessed by Tapsoba (2010) who has established evidence of some 
causal effect. The founding and progress of entrepreneurs in East Africa has been investigated 
by Khavul et al. (2009) who concluded that substantial community and family ties are 
employed by entrepreneurs to grow their businesses. Furthermore, members of the family also 
serve as a reliable and flexible source of cheap labour which is relevant in mitigating costs 
when enterprises are at initial stages of development (Kuada, 2009). The practical and 
theoretical insights into the role of foreign direct investment in social responsibility in 
developing countries were considered by Bardy et al. (2012). Paul et al. (2010) examined the 
influence of labour regulation externalities on the cost of doing business to establish that the 
indicators of doing business from the World Bank do not provide a complete perspective on 
the employment of workers.  
The intension to become an entrepreneur by Ethiopian undergraduate students was 
scrutinised by Gerba (2012) to conclude that their desire to become entrepreneurs increased 
with lessons and studies on the doing of business.  Singh et al. (2011) investigated the drivers 
behind the decision to become entrepreneurs by Nigerian women and found the following 
motivations: the availability of (i) family capital and (ii) internal and educational 
environments which are characterised by economic deregulation and social recognition that is 
internally-oriented.  
 The relationship between youth entrepreneurship and financial literacy was examined 
by Oseifuah (2010) in South Africa to establish that financial literacy is a critical determinant 
of entrepreneurial skills. Mensah and Benedict (2010) studied the long-run consequences of 
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entrepreneurship “training” to conclude that poverty-reducing hand-outs from the government 
only lead to short-run impacts, with ambiguous externalities on violent protests and 
demonstrations. Conversely, the availability of training and opportunities for entrepreneurship 
provide small enterprises with avenues for improving their businesses which eventually 
mitigate poverty. The above narratives are broadly in line with policy reports (see Leke et al., 
2010; Ernst & Young, 2013) and literature surveys (Kuada, 2015) on the challenges to 
entrepreneurship in Africa.  
In more contemporary African entrepreneurship literature, Tchamyou (2016) 
investigated the role of the knowledge economy in doing business, whereas Asongu and 
Tchamyou (2016) evaluated the influence of entrepreneurship in the knowledge economy. An 
interesting finding from the two studies is that causality flows in both directions, notably from 
the knowledge economy to entrepreneurship and from entrepreneurship to knowledge 
economy. As emphasised in the introduction, the present inquiry builds on the underlying 
literature to assess whether mobile phone penetration modulates the effect of different 
indicators of governance on some indicators of the ease of doing business in SSA3. 
Contemporary literature on the use of technology for entrepreneurial activities has 
included: emphasis on a series of innovations in entrepreneurship which are continuously 
improving because of financial resources and novel skills (Best, 2015); opportunity discovery 
and opportunity creation within the perspective of disruptive innovation (Wan et al., 2015; 
Hang et al., 2015), opportunities of entrepreneurship from an ageing population (Kohlbacher 
et al., 2015) and evolving ecosystems (Overholm,  2015), identification of opportunities by 
research collaborators (McKelveyet al., 2015) and scientific entrepreneurs (Maine et al., 
2015) and technological advancements offering new opportunities owing to the road-mapping 
of patents (Jeong & Yoon, 2015). This investigation also complements a stream of technology 
management literature on the consequences of emerging technologies, particularly: on the 
relevance  of mobile phones in social change and development (Cozzens, 2011; Mira & 
Dangersfield, 2012; Brouwer & Brito,  2012; Islama & Meadeb, 2012; Thakar, 2012; 
Alkemade  & Surrs, 2012; Gupta & Jain, 2012; Sonne, 2012; Amankwah-Amoah, 2015, 
2016; Amankwah-Amoah & Sarpong, 2016).  
 The theoretical underpinning motivating the study is the institutions theory. According 
to the theory, institutions (i.e. a composition of formal norms and informal rules and their 
                                                          
3
 The mobile phone is used as a policy variable or as a grease/facilitator for the effect of governance on 
entrepreneurship. This is essentially why in the computation of net effects, the unconditional effect of 
governance and interactive effects (of governance and mobile phones) are used. 
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enforcements) are relevant in elucidating the behaviour of entrepreneurs and firms. 
Accordingly, good governance provides enabling conditions for entrepreneurship or doing of 
business. This theoretical underpinning is consistent with the broad stream of literature on the 
subject, notably: (i)  the relevance of formal institutions in enabling firms to reduce undue 
costs and risks in the conduct of market transactions (Meyer et al., 2009); (ii) institutional 
quality in organisational frameworks (Scott, 2001, 2002) and structures (Myers & Rowan, 
1977); (iii) firms’ responses to institutional processes for strategic purposes (Oliver, 1991; 
Peng, 2003a, 2013b), sustainable competitive advantage (Oliver, 1997) and (iv) value creation 
through mergers and acquisitions (Du & Boateng, 2015). Having clarified the theoretical 
underpinning on the relationship between institutions and doing business, it is important to 
engage the theoretical role of mobile phones in modulating governance.  
We briefly summarise the literature on the relationship between mobile phones and 
governance. In accordance with Hellstrom (2008), the mobile phone as an ICT can be used to 
improve governance because it, among others: facilitates transparency, openness and the flow 
of information between various departments of government and institutions within a given 
country. According to the underpinnings, information decentralization through enhanced 
mobile phone networks mitigates opportunities for poor governance. While the position 
accords with a bulk of the empirical literature on the relationship between ICT and 
governance (Suarez, 2006; Boulianne, 2009; Diamond, 2010; Grossman et al., 2014), it is also 
important to note that there is a contending strand which maintains that collective violent 
action can be facilitated by ICT (Breuer et al., 2012; Pierskalla  & Hollenbach, 2013; 
Weidmann & Shapiro, 2015; Manacorda & Tesei, 2016). In the light of this background, the 
following hypothesis is tested in the empirical section.  
 
Hypothesis: mobile phone penetration modulates the effect of different indicators of 
governance on some indicators of the ease of doing business. 
 
In the light of above hypothesis, governance entails three dimensions: (i) political (comprising 
voice & accountability and political stability/no violence), (ii) economic (involving 
government effectiveness and regulation quality) and (iii) institutional (including corruption-
control and rule of law). Ten dimensions of entrepreneurship or doing business are also 
considered (see Section 3.1). The hypothesis is investigated by computing the net effect of the 
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modulating role of the mobile phone on the effect of governance on different doing business 
indicators.  
 Considering the substantially documented positive relationship between ICT and good 
governance, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the mobile phone can modulate the effect of 
governance on conditions for entrepreneurship. The intuition motivating the perspective that 
mobile phones can improve governance for better environments for  doing business typically 
builds on the role of ICT in reducing information asymmetry (between government 
institutions and entrpreneurrs) that may be associated with the creation and running of 
enterprises. In summary, ICT-driven governance can provide conducive situations that 
mitigate informational rents which limit the doing of business. This intuition  is broadly 
consistent with the theoretical underpinning of increasing financial allocation efficiency by 
means of information sharing mechanisms like public credit registreies and private credit 
bureaus (see Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017). In the same vein, the mobile phone can serve as an 
informaion sharing medium that enhances efficiency in the doing of business. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 The study investigates an unbalanced panel of 48 countries in SSA with data from 
World Development Indicators (WDI) and World Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World 
Bank for the period 2000-20124. The adopted periodicity is based on data availability 
constraints whereas the scope of SSA is in line with the motivation of the study. Consistent 
with recent entrepreneurship literature (Tchamyou, 2016; Asongu & Tchamyou, 2016), ten 
dependent variables on entrepreneurship are used, namely: (i) cost of business start-up 
procedure; (ii) procedure to enforce a contract; (iii) start-up procedures to register a business; 
(iv) time required to build a warehouse; (v) time required to enforce a contract; (vi) time 
required to register a property; (vii) time required to start a business; (viii) time to export; (ix) 
time to prepare and pay taxes and (x) time to resolve an insolvency. A decreasing tendency in 
these variables implies a positive condition for entrepreneurship.  
                                                          
4
 It is important to note that an unbalanced panel translates to the presence of missing observations for some 
variables. There are currently only 49 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. We have engaged 48 with the exception 
of South Sudan for which data is not available before 2011. The other five African countries from North Africa 
which are not included are: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Algeria.  
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 Six governance variables from three main categories are employed, namely: (i) 
political governance (involving political stability/no violence and voice and accountability); 
(ii) economic governance (covering government effectiveness and regulation quality) and (iii) 
institutional governance (comprising corruption-control and the rule of law). These 
governance indicators which were abstracted from Kaufmann et al. (2010) have been 
employed in recent institutional literature (see Gani, 2011; Yerrabit & Hawkes, 2015; Andrés 
et al., 2015; Oluwatobi et al., 2015; Amavilah et al., 2017). The mobile phone penetration rate 
(per 100 people) is used a policy independent variable.  
 In accordance with Tchamyou (2016), five control variables are adopted, namely: 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth; population growth; foreign direct investment; private 
domestic credit and foreign aid. Theoretically, we expect all the control variables to have a 
positive influence on conditions for entrepreneurship. However, it is also important to note 
that some expected signs may depend on market dynamism and expansion. For instance, 
foreign aid and private domestic credit may be more sensitive to some dimensions of doing 
business than others. The intuition for these expected signs is consistent with Tchamyou 
(2016). In the light of the literature discussed in Section 2, the selected variables are 
consistent with the inquiry because we have used entrepreneurship, mobile phone and 
governance variables. The selection of the variables has also been justified by their use in the 
literature.  
 The definition of the variables and corresponding sources are provided in Appendix 1, 
whereas the summary statistics are disclosed in Appendix 2. The correlation matrix which is 
used to check for potential multicollinearity is provided in Appendix 3. Potential concerns 
about multicollinearity are exclusively apparent among governance variables. The governance 
variables are employed in distinct specifications in order to avoid the concerns of 
multicollinearity. To mitigate the bias associated with the fact that the variables may not be 
normally distributed, we use an estimation technique other than Ordinary Least Squares.  
 
3. 2. Methodology 
 The Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach is adopted for the 
following five reasons. First, the number of countries or cross-sections (N equals 49) is 
substantially higher than the periodicity per cross-section (T equals 13). Second, the doing of 
business dependent variables are persistent because correlation coefficients with their 
respective first lags are higher than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800. As shown in 
11 
 
Appendix 4, the correlation coefficient between the cost of business start-up procedure and its 
first lag is 0.928. This is also the case with the number of procedures to enforce a contract 
(0.997); start-up procedures to register a business (0.940); time required to build a warehouse 
(0.964); time required to enforce a contract (0.983); time required to register a property 
(0.918); time required to start a business (0.926); time to export (0.976); time to prepare and 
pay taxes  (0.992) and time to resolve an insolvency (0.999). Third, given that the GMM 
estimation technique is consistent with a panel data structure, cross-country variations are not 
eliminated in the estimations. Fourth, the system estimator considers inherent biases in the 
difference estimator. Fifth, the estimation procedure accounts for endogeneity by controlling 
for simultaneity in the explanatory variables using an instrumentation process. Moreover, 
usage of time-invariant omitted variables (or time fixed effects) also helps to mitigate the 
consequences of endogeneity bias.   
 In accordance with Bond et al. (2001), the system GMM estimator (see Arellano & 
Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) has better estimation properties than the difference 
estimator (see Arellano & Bond, 1991). In this study, we opt for the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) 
extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) because it has been documented to restrict the 
proliferation of instruments and control for dependence among cross-sections (see Love & 
Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Boateng et al., 2016). Hence, the extended estimation 
procedure adopts forward orthogonal deviations as opposed to first differences. A two-step 
procedure is adopted instead of a one-step approach because it addresses concerns of 
heteroscedasticity given that the one-step procedure only controls for homoscedasticity.  
The following equations in level (1) and first difference in (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiB ,
 
is a doing business indicator in  country i
 
at  period t , 0  is a constant,
 
G  is 
governance (political stability, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulation 
quality, corruption-control and rule of law),  M  represents mobile phone penetration, GM is 
the interaction between governance and mobile phone penetration, 
 
W  is the vector of control 
variables (GDP growth, population growth, foreign direct investment, private domestic credit 
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and foreign aid),
 

 
represents the coefficient of auto-regression, t
 
is the time-specific 
constant,
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 It is appropriate to devote space to discussing identification properties and exclusion 
restrictions in the GMM specification. All independent indicators are acknowledged as 
predetermined or are suspected to be endogenous.  Additionally, exclusively time-invariant 
variables or years are considered to be strictly exogenous (also Boateng et al., 2016; Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016b). The intuition for the consideration builds on the fact that it is not 
likely for the time-invariant variables to become endogenous after a first difference 
(Roodman, 2009b)5.  
 In the light of above emphasis, the time-invariant variables impact on the outcome 
variable exclusively through the predetermined variables. Furthermore, the statistical 
relevance of the exclusion restriction is investigated with the Difference in Hansen Test 
(DHT) for instrument exogeneity.  Accordingly, the null hypothesis of the DHT should not be 
rejected for the time-invariant indicators to explain the doing business variables exclusively 
through the suspected endogenous variables. Hence, in the findings that are reported in 
Section 4, the assumption of exclusion restriction is validated if the alternative hypothesis of 
the DHT related to instrumental variables (IV) (year, eq(diff)) is not accepted. This is broadly 
in accordance with the standard IV procedure in which, a rejection of the null hypothesis of 
the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test is an indication that the instruments affect 
the doing business variables beyond the suggested predetermined variable channels (see Beck 
et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c).  
 
 
4.  Empirical Results  
4. 1 Presentation of results  
Tables 1 to 10 respectively present findings corresponding to the: cost of business start-up 
procedure; procedure to enforce a contract; start-up procedures to register a business; time 
required to build a warehouse; time required to enforce a contract; time required to register a 
property; time required to start a business; time to export; time to prepare and pay taxes and 
time to resolve an insolvency. For all tables: (i) four information criteria are employed to 
                                                          
5
 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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assess the validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal deviations6 and (ii) a net 
effect is computed to assess the modulating effect of mobile phones in the effect of 
governance on doing business.  For instance, in Table 1, in the second column, the net effect 
from the interaction between mobile phones and political stability is -8.119 ([0.110× 23.379] 
+ [-10.691]),  where: the mean value of mobile phone penetration is 23.379, the unconditional 
effect of political stability is -10.691  while the conditional effect from the interaction 
between political stability and mobile phones is 0.1107.  
 The following findings can be established on the linkages between mobile phone 
penetration, governance and the doing of business.  
First, the net effect of mobile phones in governance is consistently negative on the 
cost of start-up procedures.  
Second, the net effect of mobile phones in governance for the number of procedures to 
enforce a contract is positive for political stability and negative for the rule of law. For the 
remaining governance variables, whereas the unconditional effects are insignificant, the 
corresponding marginal effects are consistently negative. In other words, an additional unit of 
mobile phone penetration interacts with the governance variables to decrease the number of 
procedures needed to enforce a contract.  
Third, in Table 3, there is a positive net effect on the number of procedures to register 
a business from the interaction between regulation quality and mobile phones. Furthermore, 
positive marginal effects are apparent from regressions pertaining to political stability and the 
rule of law.  
Fourth, in spite of positive marginal effects on the time required to build a warehouse, 
there are negative net effects from interactions with political stability, regulation quality and 
the rule of law.  
Fifth, with regard to the time required to enforce a contract, there is (i) a positive net 
effect from voice and accountability, despite a corresponding negative marginal effect and (ii) 
a positive marginal impact from the interaction with government effectiveness.  
                                                          
6
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in the Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity 
of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De 
Moor, 2017, p.200). 
7
 Also see Asongu and Le Roux (2017) for more insights into interactive regressions.   
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Sixth, in Table 6 on the time required to register a property, (i) with the exception of 
interactions with government effectiveness, there are negative marginal effects from the 
interaction of mobile phones with other governance variables and (ii) there are positive net 
effects from political stability, voice and accountability and the rule of law.  
Seventh, both the unconditional and conditional effects are not overwhelmingly 
significant in Table 7, with the exceptions of positive unconditional and conditional effects 
from respectively voice and accountability and regulation quality.   
Eight, there is a positive (negative) net effect from political stability (regulation 
quality) with a corresponding negative (positive) marginal effect in Table 8.   
Ninth, in Table 9 on the linkages between governance and mobile phone penetration, 
there is a positive (i) net effect from political stability with a corresponding negative marginal 
effect and (ii) a marginal effect from the interaction with regulation quality.  
Tenth, on the time to resolve insolvency, there are consistently positive marginal 
effects across specifications and negative net effects from political stability, regulation 
quality, corruption-control and the rule of law in Table 108.  Most of the significant control 
variables have the expected signs.  
 
“Insert Tables 1-10 here” 
 
4. 2 Further discussion of results and policy implications 
 For the most part, our findings have shown that when governance channels are 
complemented with  ICT in the perspective of mobile phone penetration, the outcome on 
doing business can be positive. This is essentially because when the net effects from the 
underlying interaction on the cost of and constraints to doing business are not positive, the 
corresponding marginal impacts are negative. Three practical implications may be deduced 
from the above. They are:  (i) creating favourable economic conditions that enhance mobile 
phone penetration, (ii) improving governance standards so as to decrease the negative skew of 
governance variables and (iii) enhancing the environment surrounding the complementarity of 
mobile phones with governance mechanisms. In what follows, these points are discussed in 
chronological order. 
 First, as argued in the introduction, compared to other regions of the world, the 
penetration potential for mobile phones is highest in Africa. The specific context of SSA is 
                                                          
8
 It is important to note that owing to concerns of  instrument proliferation and  issues in degrees of freedom, 
four instead of five control variables are used for the specifications in Table 10.  
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confirmed by Asongu et al. (2016) who maintain that while the usage of mobile phones is 
lowest in SSA, the corresponding growth rate is highest in the sub-region. Therefore, in order 
to leverage on such penetration potential for development externalities like business and/or 
entrepreneurship opportunities, policy reforms should address concerns related to the lack of 
infrastructure and limited affordability which are important access barriers to mobile phone 
usage. Universal coverage schemes via non-profit activities and low pricing on the one hand 
and the liberalisation of the ICT sector and provision of basic mobile phone infrastructure on 
the other, are steps in the right direction of  boosting mobile phone penetration.  
 Second, most of the governance variables are negatively skewed (see summary 
statistics) which implies that when governance is already very poor and negatively affects the 
doing of business, the complementary effect of mobile phone penetration may not lead to the 
desired results unless improvements in governance standards are undertaken in conjunction 
with improvements in a favourable environment for the interaction between mobile phones 
and governance. 
 Third, our findings for the most part have shown that the mobile phone can be 
employed as a valuable complementary tool in the role of governance in the doing of 
business. Therefore, policy actions could improve such complementarity to enhance 
entrepreneurial activities by involving at least two reform measures. They are (i) tailoring 
mobile phones to boost openness, transparency and the free flow of data/information between 
various government institutions and departments and (ii) strengthening mobile-governance 
applications and services in order to enhance the free flow of information between 
corporations and government institutions as well as to enable businesses to actively 
participate in decisions that affect their operations.  
 In the light of the above, mobile telephony can act as a participative interface between 
the government and corporations on the one hand and emerging entrepreneurs on the other. 
For these purposes, policies on mobile phone penetration need to be designed to boost, among 
others: cost-effectiveness, efficiency, adoption, interaction, outreach and access along the 
following lines.  
First, with regard to ‘increasing outreach’ due to poor infrastructure networks, it is 
essential to increase the ownership of mobile phones in remote areas (especially rural regions) 
that do not have the infrastructure that can accommodate the internet and other 
communication and transportation facilities. Second, providing entrepreneurs with the means 
of communicating with the help of mobile phones anywhere and anytime is a step in the right 
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direction. Third, the connection between entrepreneurs and government institutions with the 
help of mobile phones is more effective in certain specific scenarios, compared to more 
traditional media like posters, radios, brochures and public speeches. Fourth, business 
activities may be substantially enhanced if mobile phones are designed to be an integral part 
of the interface between government institutions and entrepreneurs (present and potential).  
Fifth, communications between entrepreneurs and government institutions can also be 
enhanced if mobile phone applications are tailored to favour feedbacks and suggestions from 
entrepreneurs in the doing of business. Sixth, consistent with the narrative in the previous 
paragraph, affordability of and access to mobile phones can be improved in remote/rural areas 
by inter alia: subsidising community ownership and mobile infrastructure for collective 
entrepreneurial projects  
 Overall, if governance standards are improved and mobile phone penetration levels 
increased across SSA, the major unemployment concern owing to the  growing population in 
Africa in the post-2015 development agenda can be addressed through private sector 
activities. We may note that Asongu (2013) has concluded that in the long term, only the 
private sector can accommodate unemployment resulting from Africa’s burgeoning 
population.  
 Another policy implication worth discussing is the relevance of ICT in reducing 
information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and government institutions. Accordingly, the 
established positive net effects are indications that the mobile phone reduces government 
inefficiency (which potentially represents an additional cost to doing business) by reducing 
informational rents, bureaucracy and transaction costs.  
 In the light of the above, another theoretical implication of the study largely builds on 
the role of the mobile phone as an information sharing mechanism. This is essentially because 
information sharing by means of the mobile phone can substantially mitigate information 
asymmetry between various government departments. Hence, by increasing transparency and 
reducing informational rents, government institutions can provide more favourable conditions 
for efficiency in the doing of business. With insights from this clarification, the role of the 
mobile phone in improving governance for ‘doing business’ efficiency is broadly consistent 
with the theoretical basis of efficiency in financial intermediation by means of information 
sharing offices (such as private credit bureaus and public credit registries) (see Asongu et al., 
2017).  
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5. Conclusion and Future Research Directions 
This study has investigated whether mobile phone penetration modulates the effect of 
different indicators of governance on some indicators of the ease of doing business in Sub-
Saharan Africa with data from the period 2000-2012 by employing the Generalised Method of 
Moments.  Three broad concepts of governance have been used. They are: (i) political 
(involving voice and accountability and political stability/no violence), (ii) economic 
(comprising government effectiveness and regulation quality) and (iii) institutional (covering 
corruption-control and rule of law). Ten dimensions of entrepreneurship were considered.   
Two main findings were established with respect to the net effects from the interaction 
between mobile phones and governance dynamics. They comprise: (i) a reduction in the cost 
of business start-up procedures, the time to build a warehouse and the time to resolve an 
insolvency and (ii) an increase in the start-up procedure to register a business (though in only 
one of the six specifications); the time required to enforce a contract; the time required to 
register a property and the time to prepare and pay taxes.  When net effects are adverse, the 
corresponding marginal impacts are favourable to entrepreneurship for the most part.  
Implications for policy and theory have been discussed. 
 The primary contribution of this paper has been to complement the existing 
macroeconomic and institutional literature on how entrepreneurship can be boosted in less 
developed countries. The inquiry has combined the issues raised in the introduction by 
assessing how the potential for mobile phone penetration can improve governance in order to 
create favourable conditions for entrepreneurship. Such boost in entrepreneurship could 
potentially address contemporary policy challenges in Africa like inequality, poverty and 
rising unemployment.  
 Further research can focus on other instruments through which the mobile phone can 
be used to enhance entrepreneurship in Africa. Considering mobile phone complementarities 
like the internet, the degree of innovation and the quality of education are steps in this 
direction.  While there is currently a constraint in the availability of mobile banking data, 
assessing how the established findings withstand empirical scrutiny with mobile banking data 
would improve on the extant literature.  
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Table 1: Governance, mobile phones and cost of business start-up procedures 
       
 Dependent variable: Cost of business start-up procedures 
       
 
  Political 
Stability 
 (PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  
(CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
 
      
Constant  5.421 -6.476 14.330** -16.883 9.309 -5.751 
 (0.661) (0.511) (0.039) (0.174) (0.274) (0.491) 
Cost of start-up procedure (-1) 0.752*** 0.739*** 0.742*** 0.737*** 0.752*** 0.739*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) -0.258*** -0.211*** -0.259*** -0.131* -0.348*** -0.114* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) (0.073) 
Political Stability -10.691*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.002)      
Voice & Accountability --- -17.184*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.001)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -16.040*** --- --- --- 
   (0.002)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- -22.491*** --- --- 
    (0.005)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- -13.257*** --- 
     (0.004)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -26.112*** 
      (0.000) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob 0.110** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.020)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.110* --- --- --- --- 
  (0.065)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.087* --- --- --- 
   (0.096)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.210*** --- --- 
    (0.001)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.175*** --- 
     (0.004)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.280*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.415* 0.189 0.338 0.194 0.090 0.094 
 (0.076) (0.498) (0.232) (0.467) (0.738) (0.661) 
Population growth  9.822** 13.917*** 6.408** 19.525*** 8.665** 13.735*** 
 (0.038) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.014) (0.001) 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.303*** 0.191** 0.013 0.272*** 0.332*** 0.193*** 
 (0.000) (0.038) (0.829) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Foreign Aid -1.331*** -1.433*** -1.500*** -1.782*** -1.596*** -1.564*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit  0.255 0.282 0.148 0.243 0.176 0.132 
 (0.126) (0.173) (0.339) (0.289) (0.271) (0.375) 
       
Net Effects  -8.119 -14.612 -14.006 -17.581 -9.165 -19.565 
       
AR(1) (0.154) (0.154) (0.160) (0.155) (0.156) (0.157) 
AR(2) (0.465) (0.402) (0.410) (0.362) (0.368) (0.386) 
Sargan OIR (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Hansen OIR (0.581) (0.456) (0.216) (0.494) (0.410) (0.615) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.234) (0.169) (0.200) (0.391) (0.169) (0.281) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.771) (0.703) (0.317) (0.525) (0.643) (0.764) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.719) (0.377) (0.216) (0.429) (0.435) (0.518) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.268) (0.555) (0.345) (0.537) (0.365) (0.625) 
       
Fisher  3991.84*** 7194.48*** 12591.09*** 13910.87*** 3775.29*** 5831.21*** 
Instruments  42 42 42 42 42 42 
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Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
Table 2: Governance, mobile phones and procedures to enforce a contract 
       
 Dependent variable: Procedures to enforce a contract 
       
 
  Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  
(CC) 
Rule of 
Law (RL) 
 
      
Constant  -0.508 0.270 -0.463* -0.292 -0.595** 1.177** 
 (0.223) (0.487) (0.067) (0.346) (0.021) (0.023) 
Procedure to enforce a contract (-1) 1.019*** 0.988*** 1.015*** 1.008*** 1.018*** 0.967*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0009* -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.001** 
 (0.316) (0.375) (0.084) (0.195) (0.386) (0.042) 
Political Stability 0.105*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.007)      
Voice & Accountability --- -0.073 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.149)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- 0.057 --- --- --- 
   (0.338)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- 0.009 --- --- 
    (0.902)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- 0.035 --- 
     (0.388)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -0.151** 
      (0.034) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.001*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- -0.001*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.009)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- -0.002*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- -0.001*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- -0.001*** --- 
     (0.000)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- -0.003*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.002 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 
 (0.100) (0.321) (0.075) (0.599) (0.002) (0.319) 
Population growth  -0.095*** -0.021 -0.060*** -0.033 -0.066*** -0.026 
 (0.004) (0.608) (0.003) (0.222) (0.000) (0.323) 
Foreign Direct Investment -0.002*** -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.001** 0.0002 -0.002* 
 (0.008) (0.762) (0.708) (0.039) (0.784) (0.073) 
Foreign Aid 0.00002 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 0.00008 -0.0003 
 (0.958) (0.154) (0.263) (0.342) (0.803) (0.334) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.0005 0.004** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004** 
 (0.429) (0.048) (0.033) (0.003) (0.001) (0.024) 
       
Net Effects  0.081 na na na na -0.221 
       
AR(1) (0.060) (0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.060) 
AR(2) (0.166) (0.134) (0.146) (0.156) (0.138) (0.139) 
Sargan OIR (0.581) (0.063) (0.926) (0.943) (0.933) (0.238) 
Hansen OIR (0.863) (0.684) (0.729) (0.871) (0.490) (0.631) 
DHT for instruments       
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(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.382) (0.443) (0.743) (0.559) (0.707) (0.359) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.942) (0.720) (0.581) (0.882) (0.325) (0.717) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.777) (0.943) (0.617) (0.822) (0.774) (0.919) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.748) (0.118) (0.698) (0.683) (0.129) (0.111) 
       
Fisher  46847.80*** 26615.62*** 152693.3*** 127891.1*** 17994.8*** 14416.7*** 
Instruments  42 42 42 42 42 42 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
Table 3: Governance, mobile phones and start-up procedures to register a business 
       
 Dependent variable: Start-up procedures to register a business  
       
 
  Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of 
Law (RL) 
 
      
Constant  -0.468 0.047 0.808** 0.073 0.611* 0.282 
 (0.136) (0.907) (0.034) (0.817) (0.077) (0.324) 
Procedures to register a business(-1) 1.011*** 1.018*** 0.982*** 1.012*** 0.996*** 1.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.0004 0.0006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0003 
 (0.867) (0.758) (0.366) (0.502) (0.376) (0.845) 
Political Stability -0.081 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.243)      
Voice & Accountability --- 0.379*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- 0.194 --- --- --- 
   (0.277)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- 0.221* --- --- 
    (0.065)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- 0.223 --- 
     (0.132)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -0.009 
      (0.912) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob 0.004*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.007)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- -0.0002 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.901)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.002 --- --- --- 
   (0.166)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.005** --- --- 
    (0.025)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.002 --- 
     (0.196)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.006*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.0008 0.001 -0.001 -0.007 0.000004 0.0009 
 (0.857) (0.760) (0.706) (0.179) (0.999) (0.824) 
Population growth  -0.005 0.001 -0.018 -0.016 0.006 -0.051 
 (0.935) (0.979) (0.778) (0.751) (0.908) (0.338) 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Private Domestic Credit  -0.008*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.021*** 0.039 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.407) 
       
Net Effects  na na na 0.337 na na 
       
AR(1) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
AR(2) (0.717) (0.708) (0.664) (0.703) (0.715) (0.690) 
Sargan OIR (0.034) (0.035) (0.068) (0.141) (0.114) (0.040) 
Hansen OIR (0.142) (0.348) (0.668) (0.260) (0.340) (0.240) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.262) (0.167) (0.192) (0.139) (0.416) (0.132) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.165) (0.560) (0.892) (0.468) (0.321) (0.444) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.134) (0.340) (0.727) (0.368) (0.405) (0.159) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.344) (0.400) (0.387) (0.207) (0.288) (0.571) 
       
Fisher  9753.58*** 1354.60*** 2084.74*** 5362.74*** 1806.21*** 751.08*** 
Instruments  42 42 42 42 42 42 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
Table 4: Governance, mobile phones and time required to build a warehouse 
       
 Dependent variable: Time required to build a warehouse 
       
 
  Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
 
      
Constant  3.403 19.388*** 16.660*** 16.374*** 25.011*** 11.944** 
 (0.433) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
Time to build a warehouse (-1) 0.992*** 0.927*** 0.946*** 0.909*** 0.920*** 0.944*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) -0.036 -0.038 -0.049 0.040 -0.055 0.008 
 (0.115) (0.295) (0.176) (0.283) (0.190) (0.771) 
Political Stability -2.645*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.005)      
Voice & Accountability --- -2.060 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.132)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -1.722 --- --- --- 
   (0.316)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- -5.610* --- --- 
    (0.054)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- -0.701 --- 
     (0.732)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -5.458*** 
      (0.003) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob 0.050** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.011)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.009 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.709)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.023 --- --- --- 
   (0.383)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.094** --- --- 
    (0.014)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.004 --- 
     (0.876)  
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‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.087*** 
      (0.001) 
GDP growth 0.128** 0.079 0.095 0.046 -0.055 0.089 
 (0.037) (0.319) (0.151) (0.527) (0.334) (0.274) 
Population growth  -0.831 -2.305** -2.253** -0.366 -3.029*** -1.089 
 (0.358) (0.030) (0.020) (0.758) (0.004) (0.248) 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.235*** 0.126*** 0.115*** 0.189*** 0.158*** 0.170*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid -0.323*** -0.222*** -0.232*** -0.286*** -0.245*** -0.284*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.002 -0.076 2.087 -0.057 -0.081 -0.063 
 (0.959) (0.108) (0.143) (0.359) (0.137) (0.243) 
       
Net Effects  -1.476 na na -3.412 na -3.424 
       
AR(1) (0.124) (0.122) (0.123) (0.120) (0.122) (0.121) 
AR(2) (0.152) (0.172) (0.169) (0.155) (0.166) (0.165) 
Sargan OIR (0.239) (0.574) (0.565) (0.572) (0.199) (0.576) 
Hansen OIR (0.450) (0.979) (0.927) (0.792) (0.838) (0.960) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.819) (0.314) (0.221) (0.216) (0.236) (0.243) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.234) (1.000) (0.998) (0.958) (0.973) (1.000) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.588) (0.918) (0.892) (0.748) (0.746) (0.886) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.203) (0.973) (0.711) (0.604) (0.764) (0.933) 
       
Fisher  4368.05*** 7643.51*** 5318.15*** 2133.00*** 3538.49*** 3629.85*** 
Instruments  40 40 40 40 40 40 
Countries  43 43 43 43 43 43 
Observations  248 248 248 248 248 248 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
Table 5: Governance, mobile phones and time required to enforce a contract 
       
 Dependent variable: Time required to enforce a contract 
       
 
  Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality 
(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of 
Law (RL) 
 
      
Constant  26.631*** 22.366*** 27.787** 19.902** 15.948* 33.392*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.014) (0.062) (0.001) 
Time to enforce  a contract (-1) 1.004*** 1.010*** 1.042*** 1.027*** 1.041*** 1.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) -0.061 -0.140** -0.192*** -0.112** -0.108** -0.096 
 (0.290) (0.018) (0.009) (0.016) (0.033) (0.199) 
Political Stability 3.247*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.001)      
Voice & Accountability --- 6.379** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.025)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -0.107 --- --- --- 
   (0.978)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- 0.506 --- --- 
    (0.874)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- -0.558 --- 
     (0.854)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -5.420 
      (0.197) 
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‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.022 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.279)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- -0.098** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.042)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.142** --- --- --- 
   (0.018)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.033 --- --- 
    (0.613)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.013 --- 
     (0.679)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- -0.011 
      (0.793) 
GDP growth 0.728** 0.591** 1.135*** 0.887*** 0.733*** 0.786*** 
 (0.012) (0.022) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Population growth  -7.884*** -10.502*** -13.004*** -10.140*** -11.395*** -14.841*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment -0.047 -0.052 -0.238*** -0.202*** -0.224*** -0.042 
 (0.393) (0.326) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.420) 
Foreign Aid 0.032 0.012 -0.006 -0.003 0.022 0.105** 
 (0.494) (0.731) (0.886) (0.917) (0.560) (0.010) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.423*** -0.310*** -0.470** -0.370** -0.483*** -0.354*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.020) (0.033) (0.001) (0.008) 
       
Net Effects  na 4.087 na na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) 
AR(2) (0.859) (0.693) (0.954) (0.915) (0.934) (0.670) 
Sargan OIR (0.445) (0.306) (0.510) (0.627) (0.331) (0.410) 
Hansen OIR (0.832) (0.937) (0.303) (0.768) (0.383) (0.719) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.765) (0.685) (0.484) (0.631) (0.592) (0.488) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.716) (0.922) (0.244) (0.706) (0.276) (0.733) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.747) (0.736) (0.429) (0.724) (0.415) (0.562) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.720) (0.988) (0.206) (0.598) (0.347) (0.772) 
       
Fisher  217058.87*** 10678.92*** 8469.18*** 12375.8*** 14951.12*** 9959.80*** 
Instruments  42 42 42 42 42 42 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
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Table 6: Governance, mobile phones and time required to register a property 
       
 Dependent variable: Time required to register a property 
       
    
 
  Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness  
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  
(CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
 
      
Constant  22.652** 26.822*** 12.041 24.546*** 5.422 22.382** 
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.136) (0.006) (0.263) (0.030) 
Time to register a property (-1) 0.783*** 0.760*** 0.767***  0.762*** 0.823*** 0.801*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) -0.041 -0.119*** -0.011 -0.072 0.021 -0.079 
 (0.452) (0.001) (0.865) (0.348) (0.712) (0.218) 
Political Stability 4.502** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.038)      
Voice & Accountability --- 7.156*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.007)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -3.097 --- --- --- 
   (0.379)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- -4.583 --- --- 
    (0.279)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- 4.322 --- 
     (0.113)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- 7.336** 
      (0.011) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.096*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.007)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- -0.153*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- -0.075 --- --- --- 
   (0.117)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- -0.133** --- --- 
    (0.039)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- -0.113** --- 
     (0.025)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- -0.191*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.682*** 0.673** 0.834*** 0.694*** 0.926*** 0.745*** 
 (0.009) (0.036) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
Population growth  -2.950 -2.737 -1.287 -4.799** 1.022 -3.364 
 (0.145) (0.218) (0.493) (0.026) (0.284) (0.158) 
Foreign Direct Investment -0.224*** -0.333*** -0.165** -0.206* -0.163* -0.233** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.036) (0.057) (0.072) (0.021) 
Foreign Aid 0.042* 0.020 -0.014 0.016 -0.022 0.090** 
 (0.087) (0.537) (0.732) (0.660) (0.556) (0.029) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.072 -0.048 -0.048 0.098 -0.109 -0.093 
 (0.246) (0.539) (0.481) (0.316) (0.245) (0.147) 
       
Net Effects  2.257 3.579 na na na 2.870 
       
AR(1) (0.079) (0.082) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.077) 
AR(2) (0.325) (0.327) (0.323) (0.332) (0.333) (0.321) 
Sargan OIR (0.927) (0.974) (0.883) (0.595) (0.737) (0.939) 
Hansen OIR (0.827) (0.884) (0.936) (0.571) (0.785) (0.726) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.852) (0.710) (0.762) (0.266) (0.981) (0.946) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.647) (0.829) (0.892) (0.727) (0.438) (0.415) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.754) (0.760) (0.920) (0.790) (0.936) (0.762) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.696) (0.864) (0.659) (0.161) (0.196) (0.421) 
       
Fisher  44329.73*** 3157.16*** 1340.01*** 4019.59*** 2504.42*** 3414.33*** 
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Instruments  41 41 41 41 41 41 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  282 282 282 282 282 282 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Governance, mobile phones and time required to start a business  
       
 Dependent variable: Time required to start a business  
       
 
  Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of 
Law (RL) 
 
      
Constant  -11.281* -5.836 -10.292** 10.747 -9.704** -17.780*** 
 (0.080) (0.463) (0.045) (0.140) (0.032) (0.002) 
Time required to start a business (-1) 1.203*** 1.224*** 1.193*** 1.264*** 1.122*** 1.227*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) -0.050 -0.080 0.031 -0.031 0.013 0.023 
 (0.263) (0.151) (0.573) (0.504) (0.754) (0.685) 
Political Stability -0.598 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.703)      
Voice & Accountability --- 5.791** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.017)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- 2.483 --- --- --- 
   (0.359)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- 4.033 --- --- 
    (0.306)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- 1.967 --- 
     (0.490)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- 0.796 
      (0.767) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.009 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.792)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.040 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.458)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.099 --- --- --- 
   (0.185)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.243*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.034 --- 
     (0.437)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.088 
      (0.240) 
GDP growth 0.187** 0.163*** 0.117 0.070 0.189*** 0.200*** 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.200) (0.431) (0.004) (0.007) 
Population growth  -1.383 -1.322 1.586 -3.620* 1.965 0.470 
 (0.472) (0.516à (0.354) (0.054) (0.164) (0.810) 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.169*** 0.102** 0.258*** 0.246*** 0.116** 0.217*** 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.001) 
Foreign Aid 0.033 -0.086** -0.012 0.015 0.038 0.025 
 (0.263) (0.021) (0.735) (0.654) (0.241) (0.516) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.175** -0.281* -0.134 -0.341** -0.131 -0.137 
 (0.040) (0.060) (0.258) (0.027) (0.191) (0.262) 
       
Net Effects  na na na na na na 
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AR(1) (0.042) (0.034) (0.039) (0.033) (0.042) (0.038) 
AR(2) (0.824) (0.822) (0.861) (0.850) (0.788) (0.826) 
Sargan OIR (0.007) (0.004) (0.019) (0.009) (0.001) (0.014) 
Hansen OIR (0.849) (0.513) (0.641) (0.754) (0.831) (0.698) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.264) (0.223) (0.283) (0.215) (0.166) (0.303) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.970) (0.704) (0.791) (0.937) (0.988) (0.834) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.941) (0.842) (0.589) (0.870) (0.806) (0.863) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.322) (0.100) (0.556) (0.305) (0.599) (0.238) 
       
Fisher  838.09*** 884.08*** 2008.87*** 1446.52*** 1011.74*** 731.88*** 
Instruments  42 42 42 42 42 42 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
Table 8: Governance, mobile phones and time to export 
       
 Dependent variable: Time to export 
       
 
  Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
 
      
Constant  -1.435 -1.586* -2.236*** -4.802*** -1.045 -0.704 
 (0.135) (0.079) (0.002) (0.000) (0.141) (0.393) 
Time to export (-1) 1.004*** 1.002*** 0.994*** 0.997*** 1.002*** 1.024*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.007 0.008 0.014*** 0.035*** 0.005 0.002 
 (0.126) (0.121) (0.007) (0.000) (0.245) (0.628) 
Political Stability 1.135*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Voice & Accountability --- -0.366 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.199)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -0.723* --- --- --- 
   (0.078)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- -2.337*** --- --- 
    (0.002)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- -0.324 --- 
     (0.400)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- 0.022 
      (0.957) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.013*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.004)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.002 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.576)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.003 --- --- --- 
   (0.495)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.022** --- --- 
    (0.018)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.0003 --- 
     (0.922)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- -0.002 
      (0.504 
GDP growth -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.046*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.048*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Population growth  0.067 -0.060 0.146 0.591** -0.304 -0.616*** 
 (0.825) (0.802) (0.448) (0.023) (0.186) (0.002) 
Foreign Direct Investment -0.030*** -0.018*** -0.024*** -0.012** -0.021*** -0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.010 0.0003 0.004 0.016** -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.233) (0.973) (0.463) (0.012) (0.870) (0.725) 
       
Net Effects  0.831 na na -1.822 na na 
       
AR(1) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
AR(2) (0.684) (0.628) (0.599) (0.597) (0.642) (0.611) 
Sargan OIR (0.932) (0.843) (0.682) (0.187) (0.776) (0.748) 
Hansen OIR (0.337) (0.406) (0.290) (0.382) (0.298) (0.332) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.553) (0.511) (0.477) (0.492) (0.851) (0.338) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.248) (0.341) (0.234) (0.324) (0.115) (0.362) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.500) (0.278) (0.178) (0.316) (0.366) (0.200) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.154) (0.731) (0.738) (0.546) (0.245) (0.783) 
       
Fisher  6172.95*** 4858.44*** 3994.85*** 7273.29*** 7356.54*** 3979.05*** 
Instruments  40 40 40 40 40 40 
Countries  43 43 43 43 43 43 
Observations  248 248 248 248 248 248 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
Table 9: Governance, mobile phones and time to prepare and pay taxes 
       
 Dependent variable: Time to prepare and pay taxes 
       
 
  Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
 
      
Constant  24.808*** 18.955*** 11.470 19.336** 12.461* 22.569** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.196) (0.020) (0.098) (0.023) 
Time to prepare and pay taxes (-1) 0.997*** 0.959*** 0.962*** 0.972*** 0.925*** 0.951*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.038 0.099** 0.147** 0.105** 0.246*** 0.142*** 
 (0.380) (0.029) (0.011) (0.036) (0.000) (0.008) 
Political Stability 5.476** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.038)      
Voice & Accountability --- -4.368 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.199)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -8.662* --- --- --- 
   (0.058)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- -7.113 --- --- 
    (0.119)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- -16.062*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -6.261 
      (0.163) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.057** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.040)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.031 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.386)     
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‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.057 --- --- --- 
   (0.104)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.124*** --- --- 
    (0.008)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.042 --- 
     (0.155)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.004 
      (0.898) 
GDP growth -0.447*** -0.243* -0.202 -0.186 -0.268** -0.387*** 
 (0.004) (0.059) (0.133) (0.163) (0.026) (0.007) 
Population growth  -4.554** -2.145 -1.043 -3.578* -0.593 -3.376 
 (0.011) (0.121) (0.628) (0.092) (0.701) (0.138) 
Foreign Direct Investment -0.175*** -0.153*** -0.132*** -0.115** -0.258*** -0.216*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.049) (0.001) (0.001) 
Foreign Aid 0.095*** -0.017 -0.045 -0.025 -0.161*** -0.046* 
 (0.000) (0.315) (0.175) (0.272) (0.005) (0.077) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.389*** -0.220*** -0.196* -0.362*** -0.186*** -0.264** 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.078) (0.000) (0.002) (0.012) 
       
Net Effects  4.143 na na na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.057) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.045) (0.051) 
AR(2) (0.239) (0.185) (0.181) (0.192) (0.191) (0.198) 
Sargan OIR (0.919) (0.923) (0.934) (0.885) (0.753) (0.829) 
Hansen OIR (0.198) (0.838) (0.820) (0.627) (0.828) (0.823) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.813) (0.527) (0.845) (0.432) (0.599) (0.871) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.070) (0.856) (0.641) (0.658) (0.806) (0.624) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.282) (0.710) (0.860) (0.690) (0.801) (0.630) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.181) (0.851) (0.402) (0.335) (0.583) (0.955) 
       
Fisher  22126.09*** 22232.50*** 8664.48*** 283816.1*** 9800.48*** 19413.02*** 
Instruments  40 40 40 40 40 40 
Countries  43 43 43 43 43 43 
Observations  248 248 248 248 248 248 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
Table 10: Governance, mobile phones and time to resolve insolvency 
       
 Dependent variable: Time to resolve insolvency   
       
 
  Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
 
      
Constant  -0.017*** -0.038*** -0.091*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.069*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Time to resolve insolvency (-1) 1.003*** 1.011*** 1.024*** 1.015*** 1.017*** 1.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.00009*** 0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Political Stability -0.003*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Voice & Accountability --- -0.002 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.336)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -0.005 --- --- --- 
   (0.133)    
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Regulation Quality --- --- --- -0.006** --- --- 
    (0.027)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- -0.009** --- 
     (0.042)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -0.004* 
      (0.073) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob 0.00004*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.00003* --- --- --- --- 
  (0.087)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.0001*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.0001*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.0001*** --- 
     (0.000)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.0001*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP growth -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0002* 
 (0.022) (0.135) (0.066) (0.007) (0.025) (0.054) 
Population growth  0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.002** 
 (0.004) (0.112) (0.144) (0.001) (0.176) (0.013) 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.00006** 0.00002 -0.00002 -0.0001 -0.00001 0.00004 
 (0.037) (0.478) (0.746) (0.119) (0.801) (0.174) 
Foreign Aid 0.00001 -0.000009 -0.00002 0.00005 -0.00001 -0.00002** 
 (0.689) (0.636) (0.437) (0.199) (0.310) (0.034) 
       
Net Effects  -0.002 na na -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 
       
AR(1) (0.314) (0.316) (0.316) (0.315) (0.316) (0.314) 
AR(2) (0.996) (0.560) (0.655) (0.763) (0.961) (0.525) 
Sargan OIR (0.941) (0.638) (0.822) (0.704) (0.416) (0.777) 
Hansen OIR (0.699) (0.931) (0.741) (0.757) (0.772) (0.510) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.986) (0.991) (0.948) (0.967) (0.681) (0.960) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.336) (0.688) (0.438) (0.433) (0.678) (0.205) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.982) (0.968) (0.965) (0.566) (0.933) (0.749) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.092) (0.484) (0.154) (0.819) (0.248) (0.181) 
       
Fisher  3.85e+06*** 3.45e+06*** 9.72e+06*** 8.21e+06 849695.9*** 2.22e+06*** 
Instruments  38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries  38 38 38 38 38 38 
Observations  284 284 284 284 284 284 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1:  Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables (Measurement) Sources 
    
Cost of starting 
business 
Costostart Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per 
capita) 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Contract 
enforcement 
Contractenf Procedures to enforce a contract (number) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Start-up 
procedure 
Startupproced Start-up procedures to register a business (number) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Ware house time Timewarehouse Time required to build a warehouse (days) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Time to enforce a 
contract 
Timenforcontr Timenforcontr: Time required to enforce a contract 
(days) 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Time to register a 
property 
Timeregprop Time required to register a property (days) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Time to start a 
business 
Timestartbus Time required to start a business (days) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Time to export Timexport Time to export (days) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Time to pay 
taxes  
Timetaxes Time to prepare and pay taxes (hours) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Resolving an 
insolvency 
Timeresinsolv Time to resolve insolvency (years) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
 
 
Political Stability  
 
 
PolS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as 
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional 
and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism”. 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
   
 
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free 
media” 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
   
 
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies”. 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
   
 
 
Regulation 
Quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development”. 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
   
 
 
Corruption-
Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
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corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests” 
   
 
 
 
Rule of Law  
 
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Mobile phones  Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
GDP growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Population 
growth  
Popg Population growth rate (annual %) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Foreign 
investment  
FDI Foreign Direct Investment inflows (% of GDP) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Foreign aid    Aid Total Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Private Credit  Credit Private credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.   
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2000-2012) 
         
 Mean SD Min Max Skewness Excess 
Kurtosis 
Jarque-
bera 
Obser 
         
Cost of starting 
business 
156.079 219.820 0.300 1540.2 3.734 16.376 6007*** 445 
Contract 
enforcement 
39.305 5.224 23.000 54.000 -0.350 1.063 30.061*** 445 
Start-up 
procedure 
9.856 3.005 3.000 18.000 0.383 0.794 22.624*** 445 
Ware house time 195.760 98.496 48.000 599 2.015 5.457 703.779*** 367 
Time to enforce a 
contract 
683.024 277.839 230.000 1715 1.267 2.016 194.571*** 445 
Time to register a 
property 
82.592 74.197 9.000 389 2.188 4.669 703.158*** 412 
Time to start a 
business 
49.884 43.658 5.000 260 2.070 5.140 807.689*** 445 
Time to export 33.789 14.344 10 78 0.844 0.169 44.992*** 375 
Time to pay taxes  319.382 196.048 66 1120 1.427 2.155 199.927*** 375 
Resolving an 
insolvency 
3.094 1.129 1.7 6.2 0.809 -0.210 41.323*** 372 
Mobile phone 
penetration  
23.379 28.004 0.000 147.202 1.582 2.254 359.82*** 572 
Political Stability -0.543 0.956 -3.323 1.192 -0.473 -0.440 26.204*** 578 
Voice & 
Accountability 
-0.646 0.737 -2.233 0.990 0.199 -0.764 17.866*** 578 
Government 
Effectiveness 
-0.771 0.620 -2.450 0.934 0.324 0.083 10.254*** 577 
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Regulation 
Quality 
-0.715 0.644 -2.665 0.983 -0.234 0.508 11.475*** 578 
Corruption-
Control 
-0.642 0.591 -1.924 1.249 0.683 0.198 45.855*** 579 
Rule of Law -0.741 0.662 -2.668 1.056 0.192 0.117 3.905 578 
GDP growth  4.714 6.322 -47.552 63.379 1.949 21.780 12321*** 608 
Population 
growth  
2.361 0.948 -1.081 6.576 -0.432 1.803 96.051*** 588 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
inflows 
5.332 8.737 -6.043 91.007 5.054 37.100 37150*** 603 
Foreign aid   11.687 14.193 -0.253 181.187 5.373 47.653 60054*** 606 
Private Domestic 
Credit 
18.551 22.472 0.550 149.78 3.711 15.985 6561*** 507 
         
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min : Minimum. Max : Maximum. Obser : Observations. *** : 1% signifiance level.   
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Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 247) 
                       
Cost- 
ostart 
Contra- 
ctenf 
Startup- 
proced 
Timewa 
rehouse 
Timen 
forcontr 
Time 
regprop 
Time 
startbus 
Time 
xport 
Time 
taxes 
Timere 
sinsolv 
PolS VA GE RQ CC RL GDPg Popg FDI Aid Credit Mobile 
 
1.000 0.218 0.220 0.092 -0.068 0.263 0.028 0.317 0.157 0.214 -0.258 -0.274 -0.473 -0.424 -0.416 -0.395 0.067 0.353 -0.044 0.263 -0.309 -0.396 Costostart 
 1.000 0.134 -0.005 0.041 0.088 0.043 0.238 0.288 0.264 -0.520 -0.430 -0.555 -0.630 -0.597 -0.559 0.005 0.197 0.146 0.119 -0.407 -0.330 Contractenf 
  1.000 0.013 -0.161 -0.056 0.359 0.255 0.048 0.086 -0.232 -0.266 -0.155 -0.152 -0.196 -0.215 0.071 0.057 -0.138 -0.117 -0.251 -0.255 Startupproced 
   1.000 0.133 0.286 0.121 0.010 -0.007 0.111 -0.081 -0.157 -0.180 -0.143 -0.197 -0.151 -0.169 -0.083 -0.078 -0.154 -0.249 -0.077 Timewarehouse 
    1.000 -0.136 0.278 -0.238 -0.104 0.208 0.157 -0.0009 -0.027 -0.120 0.031 -0.001 0.045 -0.131 0.317 0.325 -0.038 0.066 Timenforcontr 
     1.000 -0.045 -0.070 0.073 -0.004 -0.008 -0.056 -0.192 -0.082 -0.150 -0.076 -0.064 0.044 -0.146 0.023 -0.095 -0.246 Timeregprop 
      1.000 0.050 0.145 0.206 0.183 -0.043 -0.041 -0.136 0.017 -0.028 -0.035 -0.228 0.201 0.031 -0.074 0.035 Timestartbus 
       1.000 0.187 0.312 -0.378 -0.339 -0.413 -0.400 -0.382 -0.401 0.126 0.293 -0.097 -0.008 -0.339 -0.519 Timexport 
        1.000 0.195 -0.332 -0.275 -0.335 -0.247 -0.413 -0.403 -0.036 0.113 -0.039 -0.171 -0.154 -0.103 Timetaxes 
         1.000 -0.111 -0.142 -0.381 -0.326 -0.383 -0.369 -0.016 0.240 0.093 0.194 -0.241 -0.271 Timeresinsolv 
          1.000 0.692 0.678 0.635 0.727 0.795 -0.053 -0.289 0.033 -0.101 0.286 0.399 PolS 
           1.000 0.797 0.757 0.745 0.808 0.097 -0.143 0.013 0.017 0.524 0.324 VA 
            1.000 0.875 0.888 0.915 0.0001 -0.415 -0.148 -0.262 0.618 0.484 GE 
             1.000 0.811 0.859 -0.038 -0.239 -0.210 -0.299 0.607 0.426 RG 
              1.000 0.894 -0.022 -0.432 -0.116 -0.210 0.521 0.451 CC 
               1.000 0.011 -0.307 -0.089 -0.174 0.496 0.422 RL 
                1.000 0.244 0.189 0.300 -0.100 -0.152 GDPg 
                 1.000 0.139 0.479 -0.406 -0.450 Popg 
                  1.000 0.423 -0.102 0.022 FDI 
                   1.000 -0.172 -0.264 Aid 
                    1.000 0.464 Credit 
                     1.000 Mobile 
                       
Costostart: cost of business start-up procedure. Contractenf: Procedure to enforce a contract. Startupproced: Start-up procedures to register a business. Timewarehouse: Time required to build a warehouse. 
Timenforcontr : Time required to enforce a contract. Timeregroup: Time required to register a property. Timestartbus : Time required to start a business. Timexport: Time to export. Timetaxes: Time to prepare and pay 
taxes. Timeresinsolv : Time to resolve insolvency. PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law.  GDPg: 
GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment inflows. Aid: Foreign aid. Credit: Private domestic credit. Mobile: Mobile Phone penetration.  
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Appendix 4: Persistence outcome variables  
           
 
Cost- 
ostart 
Contra- 
ctenf 
Startup- 
proced 
Timeware- 
house 
Timen- 
forcontr 
Time- 
regprop 
Time- 
startbus 
Time- 
xport 
Time- 
taxes 
Time- 
resinsolv 
           
Costostart (-1) 0.9284          
Contractenf (-1) 
 0.9970         
Startupproced (-1) 
  0.9400        
Timewarehouse (-1) 
   0.9640       
Timenforcontr  (-1) 
    0.9883      
Timeregprop (-1) 
     0.9187     
Timestartbus (-1) 
      0.9263    
Timexport (-1) 
       0.9767   
Timetaxes (-1) 
        0.9923  
Timeresinsolv (-1) 
         0.9997 
           
Costostart: cost of business start-up procedure. Costostart (-1): lagged cost of business start-up procedure. Contractenf: Procedure to enforce 
a contract. Startupproced: Start-up procedures to register a business. Timewarehouse: Time required to build a warehouse. Timenforcontr : 
Time required to enforce a contract. Timeregroup: Time required to register a property. Timestartbus : Time required to start a business. 
Timexport: Time to export. Timetaxes: Time to prepare and pay taxes. Timeresinsolv : Time to resolve insolvency. 
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